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Abstract.  The aim of this paper is to study the effect of the credit quality information and the 
guarantees strength on the level of nonperforming loans in some MENA countries.  To this 
end we apply a dynamic panel modelling and we use annual data which covers the period 
2004-2011. The empirical results show that the information credit collected by the private or 
the public agencies affects negatively the level of nonperforming loans. The same result was 
found between the level of guarantees and the level of NPLs.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The banking activity is based on two main pillars: information and liquidity. The theory of 
financial intermediation earlier developed by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984) 
showed that if the information required by the financial institutions is not sufficient, several 
problems could occur. One of the major problems is the increase of the level of bad loans, 
also called the non-performing loans. 
 The literature on banking intermediation shows that the direct consequence of large amount 
of NPLs in the banking system generates bank failure. Given the severe impacts of NPLs on 
banks and the banking sector as a well, several studies have examined the determinants of the 
NPLs using either macroeconomic or microeconomic variables. For example, Cifter et al 
(2009) studied the impact of industrial production on the level of NPLs in the Turkish 
financial system over the period 2001-2007. Their results show that the level of economic 
activity, interest rates and total debt provide meaningful indicators for aggregate default. For a 
large panel of Italian banks over the period 1985–2002, Quagliarello (2007) finds that the 
business cycle affects NPLs. Regarding the microeconomic determinants of NPLs, Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) investigated the relationship between loans quality, cost efficiency and bank 
capital and found of a negative relationship between non-performing loans and cost 
efficiency. In another study, Salas and Saurina (2002) found a negative relationship between 
bank size and NPLs with more diversification opportunities for the bigger size. From a data 
set comprising 500 banks from 2005 to 2007, Shehzad et al. (2010) found that ownership 
proxied by three levels of shareholding (10%, 20% and 50%) has a positive impact on the 
NPLs ratio when the level of ownership concentration is defined at 10% but a negative impact 
when the level of level of ownership concentration is defined at 50%. There are also some 
studies that combined macroeconomic and microeconomic variables to explain the level NPLs 
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(Salas and Saurina (2002), Dimirios et al (2012)). In this paper, we will contribute to the 
NPLs literature by using the classical macroeconomic factors (GDP and INF) combined with 
the information depth index and the guarantees strength. To the best of our knowledge, the 
present study is the first contribution associating these indexes along with micro and 
macroeconomic factors to explain the determinants of NPLs.  In general, the loans’ quality 
depends on two dimensions: information collected and guarantees required. In this line of 
idea, sufficient information related to the borrower and sufficient guarantees could improve 
the quality of loans.  To verify this idea we use data of 9 MENA countries observed during 
the period of 2004-2011 and we perform dynamic panel data estimation. Our main results 
show that the information collected by the private or public agencies affects negatively the 
level of nonperforming loans. Similar result was found between the level of guarantees and 
the level of NPLs. 
  The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents statistics about information depth 
index and guarantees strength in MENA countries. Section 3 presents data and methodology; 
section 4 provides empirical results and finally section 4 concludes. 
II. Empirical illustration 
I. Data and Methodology  
 
To test the relationship between credit information depth, guarantees strength index 
and the level of nonperforming loans, we use data for 9 MENA countries i.e. Tunisia, Saudi 
Arabia (KSA), Egypt, UAE, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait and Oman. Time span is 
annually and it covers the period 2004-2011
1
. For panel studies, academicians and researchers 
used to employ the basic fixed and/or random effects models.  However, these techniques 
may provide inconsistent results especially when the regressors are correlated with the lagged 
                                                          
1
 Unfortunately data is not available for the other MENA countries and this is the longest available data.  
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dependent variable to some degree. To resolve this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
introduced a new method which consists on differencing all regressors and employing 
Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982).   This technique has generated a great 
attention by econometricians and it was further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). To sum up, we can 
classify these techniques into two approaches that differ in terms of the way that the 
individual effects are included in the model: the differencing GMM (DGMM) and the system 
GMM (SGMM). According to Bond, 2002; Roodman 2006 and Baum, 2006; the SGMM 
output is more consistent than DGMM in variables that are “random walk” or close to be 
random-walk variables. Therefore, as our model specification contains some macroeconomic 
variables which are known in economics for the presence of random walk statistical 
generating mechanisms, the SGMM approach seems to be the more appropriate choice 
(Efendic et al. 2006).  The econometric model can be written as follows: 
(1)              +M+ X   + NPLs  = NPLs ti,ti,3ti,21- ti,1 ti, 
 
X: is the matrix of bank specific variables, M is the matrix of macroeconomic variables. The 
extended form of equation 1 is:  
 
(2)                                                        + INF + GDP  +  FLIB  
+  UNEMP+ PUAG   + PRAG  + IGS   +  IPI NPLs  = NPLs
ti, t  i,9 t  i,8 ti,7
 t  i,6 ti,5 ti, 4 t  i,3 ti,21- ti,1 ti,

 
Where: 
NPLs, is the level of non-performing loans; NPLst-1 is the lagged non-performing 
loans to account for the accelerator effect IPI is the index of credit information depth which 
takes a value of 0 for a weak index and 6 for a high level.  IGS is the index of guarantees 
strength; it takes the value of 0 for a weak index and 10 for a high level. PRAG is private 
credit agencies. PUAG refers the public credit agencies. UNEMP is the Unemployment rate 
while FLIB refers to the date of the financial liberalization which is a Dummy variable which 
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takes 0 before and 1 after the Liberalization; GDP is the Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
and finally INF is Inflation rate is the increasing rate of CPI. The data was collected from the 
World Bank world economic indicators (WDI 2013) except for liberalization
2
.  
 
 The Figures below gives a look at the evolution of the non-performing loans and the 
indexes of information depth and Guarantees strength for the 9 countries.  
 
      Source : WDI 2013. 
 
 
As we can see in Figure 1, the curves of the nonperforming loan and the information depth 
and guarantees strength have opposing trends (aggregated level). This may reflect the 
causality between the three indicators. In this sense, the more information depth and the 
guarantees strength indexes improve, the more the nonperforming loans decrease. From 
Figure 1, we can divide the evolution into two periods: 2004-2007 and 2007-2011. During the 
first period we can see a significant downward trend of the non-performing loan combined 
with an improvement of the indexes of credit information depth and the guarantees strength. 
                                                          
2
 This variable takes 0 before liberalization and 1 after liberalization 
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The value
3
 of nonperforming loans crossed shifted from 15.52% in 2004 to 6.71% in 2011. 
Furthermore, the values of credit information depth and guarantees strength have moved from 
2.56% in 2004 to 4.44% in 2011 for the first indicator and from 3.22% in 2004 to 3.78% in 
2011 for the second. During the second period, we can see that the level of non-performing 
loans continue to decrease but at a low pace compared to the first period. Similarly, the 
indexes of credit information depth and guarantees strength improved slightly. This slow pace 
is mainly caused by the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis which affected 
severely the economies of MENA countries.  
The Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the three indicators for each country. Egypt 
and Tunisia have the highest level of non-performing loans which is 17.75 and 16.775 
respectively while Jordan and Oman have the weakest index of credit information depth; 2% 
and 2.25% respectively. In the other hand, Saudi Arabia appears to be the country with the 
weak level of nonperforming loans with an average 2,737% during 2004-2011. KSA has the 
also the most important index of information depth (5,625%).  
Jordan and Kuwait are the two countries that require a high level of guarantees to 
cover the credit risk. The average level of guarantees strength index for those countries is 
3.66% and 3.77% respectively. Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt did not require high level of 
guarantees as they have the same level (3.22%).  
To sum-up, according to the three indicators (NPL, INF DEPTH and GUARANT STREN), 
we can classify Egypt and Tunisia as the countries having the worrying value and KSA with 
the most satisfactory value.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Values are calculated according to the mean of the 9 countries. 
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II. Results  
 
We start this section by analyzing the descriptive statistics of the different variables. 
The results are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables 
 
 Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
NPLs 72 9.288889 6.421082 1.4 27.8 
IPI 72 3.513889 1.556387 1 6 
IGS 72 3.430556 0.624079 2 5 
PRAG 72 5.984722 9.141419 0 31.2 
PUAG 72 5.051389 6.935376 0 27.3 
UNEMP 72 8.061111 4.294791 1.3 18 
FLIB 72 0.666666 0.474712 0 1 
GDP 72 4.852031 3.106023 -5.2 12.8 
INF 72 5.016667 3.743577 -0.7 18.3 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the mean of non-performing loans in MENA 
countries is about 9.28%. In 2009, Egypt had the maximum value of 27.8% while Saudi 
Arabia had the minimum level (1.4%).  
The average value of the index of credit information depth is 3.51%. For the index of 
guarantees strength, the maximum value is 5% and the minimum is 2. We should note that all 
the 9 countries have not reached yet neither the maximum value of IGS which is 10 or the min 
value 1.  For the macro variables, we have the mean value of GDP per capita is around 4.85% 
with a satisfactory level of 12.8% (Oman on 2008) and a min value of -5,2% (Kuwait on 
2009). The mean level of inflation in MENA countries is 5.01% with a min value of -0,7% 
and max value of 18,3% (Egypt on 2009).  Based on these statistics, we can say that the 
MENA countries are requested to improve more the credit quality information and to require 
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appropriate guarantees. Moreover, they need some effective policy responses to stabilize their 
macroeconomic sector. These actions combined with an efficient prudential regulation would 
decrease further the level of nonperforming loans.  
As presented in Table2, the level of correlation between the different variables is very 
weak except for le relation between FLIB and UNEMP (49.99%). This reflects the absence of 
multicolinearity between the variables. Further, the correlation matrix shows that IPI, IGS, 
PRAG, PUAG and GDP act negatively on the NPLs. The UNEMP and FLIB variables are 
correlated positively with the dependent variable.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables 
    
 NPL 
 
IPI 
 
IGS 
 
PRAG 
 
PUAG 
 
UNEMP 
 
FLIB 
 
GDP 
 
INF 
NPLs 1.0000                  
IPI -
0.2845 
1.0000                
IGS -
0.3422 
-
0.0135 
1.0000              
PRAG -
0.3402 
0.4409 0.3288 1.0000            
PUAG -
0.0294 
0.0703 0.0342 -0.3354 1.0000          
UNEMP 0.4064 -
0.1358 
-0.6390 -0.5038 0.1840 1.0000        
FLIB 0.1928 -
0.2033 
-0.3169 -0.3475 0.1216 0.4999   1.0000      
GDP -
0.1198 
-
0.2222 
-0.0170 -0.1871 -0.1043 -0.0753  -0.0439 1.0000   
INF 0.0419 0.1426 -0.0755 -0.0243 -0,031 0.0472   0.1617 0.2088 1.0000 
 
The results of the model are presented in Table 3. They show that the coefficient of the 
NPLst-1 is negatively and significantly correlated with the dependent variable (NPL). This 
means that the level of NPLs at the current year (t) is negatively associated with its level of 
the previous year (t-1). 
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Table 3: System GMM Model 
  
Variables 
            
          Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
          
          Z 
     
       P>|z| 
NPLs L1.         -0.6215 0.0910        -5.86             0.000*** 
IPI         -0.1418 0.9577        -0.21        0.445 
IGS         -0.3222 3.2 120        -0.28        0.315 
PRAG         -0.1465 0.1979        -3.14        0.314 
PUAG         -0.0522 0.1351        -0.58        0.563 
UNEMP          0.1296 0.584          0.49        0.658 
FLIB         -1.8995 1.6891        -3.22          0.052* 
GDP         -0.5427 0.1875        -5.55            0.002** 
INF          0.4257 0.9658          1.12            0.000** 
CONS         0.13661 2.2215          2.32          0.045* 
F test (1)                                       12.81*** 
Hansen test                                    26.15 
AR(1) test                                      -3.11** 
AR(2) test                                      -0.881 
Observations                                  72 
***, **,* significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%,  
 
The main variables of our study (IPI, IGS, PRAG and PUAG) exert a negative effect 
on the level of NPLs. This finding is not surprising as it is rational that sufficient credit 
information help bankers to take the right decision of granting credits which in turn would 
reduce the level of non-performing loans. Further, the more the level of guarantees is high the 
more the probability of reimbursement increases. In the same line of idea, the diffusion of the 
credit information by private or public agencies allows banks to collect the maximum of 
information about the borrowers. If the information asymmetry (adverse selection) is reduced, 
banks can make a proper credit decision as they will be able to distinguish between good and 
bad borrower.  
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 The results reveal that these variables (IPI, IGS, PRAG and PUAG) did not have 
significant effects on NPLs. Therefore, all the 9 MENA countries of our study are requested 
to improve the index of credit information depth and to require more sufficient guarantees and 
to establish more private or public credit agencies.  
Our findings show a negative and significant relationship between FLIB and NPLs. 
Contrary to recent theoretical and empirical literature demonstrating the negative impact of 
financial liberalization (FLIB) on economic growth; financial liberalization reduced the non-
performing loans in MENA countries. It is worth mentioning that the liberalization program 
(also called the Structural Adjustment Programs), was implemented gradually in these 
countries. The progressive reforms helped MENA countries escaping from banking and 
financial crises and allowed banks to improve their balance sheet by diversifying their 
activities. This diversification helped banks to improve the classification of loans and 
minimize the risks. Further, as liberalization intensified competition between banks, these 
institutions were forced to improve their risk management efficiency and adopt sophisticated 
technologies which in turn have reduced the level of non-performing loans.  
Turning now to the macroeconomic factors, our results show that the per capita GDP 
is correlated negatively and significantly with the level of NPLs. This result is consistent as 
the NPLs are negatively affected when the economy is in recession.  Our findings are similar 
to Salas and Saurina (2002), Bangia and al., (2002); Carey, (2002). Regarding inflation rate, it 
exerts a positive and significant effect on the level of NPLs. Previous studies have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between inflation and the profitability of banks.  A high 
rate of inflation is generally associated with a high interest rate and therefore an important 
income for banks. (Hamdi et al (2013)). Nevertheless, a high level and unanticipated inflation 
leads to increase the financial expensive of the borrower which became unable to refund his 
debt. Consequently the level of nonperforming loan increases.  Finally, the result shows the 
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positive linkage between unemployment rate and the level of NPLs. This result is not 
surprising as (new) unemployed people are no longer capable to pay their debt.    
 
III. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to test for the possible relationship between credit 
information quality, guarantees and the level of nonperforming loan for a sample of nine 
MENA countries by the mean of a dynamic panel data modelling. The empirical results show 
that the information credit collected by the private or the public agencies affects negatively 
the level of nonperforming loans. The same result was found between the level of guarantees 
and the level of NPLs. This finding indicates that the MENA countries are requested to collect 
more credit information on their borrowers to reduce the level of nonperforming loans.  
Further, banks in MENA region should require more guarantees to minimize the risk of 
insolvency. We also found that financial liberalization acts negatively and significantly on the 
level of nonperforming loans. For the macroeconomic variables, we find that per capita GDP 
is correlated negatively and significantly with the level of nonperforming loans while inflation 
acts positively and significantly the level of NPLs.   
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